Discussion Questions:

What is Chesterton’s argument, at pp. 74-75, about the “hidden” “inexactitude” in nature and in people, about “hidden malformations or surprises”?

What does he mean, at pp. 75-76, “The complication of our modern world proves the truth of the creed”?

Explain his comment at p. 76, “There is, therefore, about all complete conviction a kind of huge helplessness.”

On pp. 77-83, Chesterton addresses contradictory critiques of Christianity, and said, at p. 83, “Such a paradox of evil rose to the stature of the supernatural.” Does he persuade you? Why or why not?

At pp. 83-84, Chesterton argues that the critics of Christianity actually disclosed more about themselves than about Christianity. Do you see parallels today?

At pp. 84-91, Chesterton says Christianity combines “furious opposites” (p.88) and “the parallel passions” (p. 89), through which the Church aimed “to give room for good things to run wild” (p. 88). Can you give examples from our world today?

At p. 91, Chesterton says that the Church was able to “(guess) the hidden eccentricities of life.” Explain why that understanding was persuasive to Chesterton about the validity of Christianity.

Is Chesterton persuasive in his rebuttal (p. 93) to the criticism of Christianity for the religious wars of the past?

Does Chesterton’s conclusion (p. 94) about “the thrilling romance of Orthodoxy”, with “the wild truth reeling but erect”, an encouragement or comfort to you?

For substantive discussion of the merits, as time and interest permit:

Page 74: The real trouble with this world of ours is not that it is an unreasonable world, nor even that it is a reasonable one. The commonest kind of trouble is that it is nearly reasonable, but not quite. Life is not an illogicality; yet it is a trap for logicians. It looks just a little more mathematical and regular than it is; its exactitude is obvious, but its inexactitude is hidden; its wildness lies in wait. . . . Suppose some mathematical creature from the moon were to reckon up the human body; he would at once see that the essential thing about it was that it was duplicate. A man is two men, he on the right exactly resembling him on the left. . . . (W)here he found a heart on one side, would deduce that there was another heart on the other. . . . It is this silent swerving from accuracy by an inch that is the uncanny element in everything. It seems a sort of secret treason in the universe. An apple or an orange is round enough to get itself called round, and yet is not round after all. The earth itself is shaped like an orange in order to lure some simple astronomer into calling it a globe. A blade of grass is called after the blade of a sword, because it comes to a point; but it doesn’t. Everywhere in things there is this element of the quiet and incalculable.

Page 75: Now, actual insight or inspiration is best tested by whether it guesses these hidden malformations or surprises. . . . Now, this is exactly the claim which I have since come to propound for Christianity. Not merely that it deduces logical truths, but that when it suddenly becomes illogical, it has found, so to speak, an illogical truth. It not only goes right about things, but it goes wrong (if one may say so) exactly where the things go wrong. Its plan suits the secret irregularities, and expects the unexpected. It is simple about the simple truth; but it is stubborn about the subtle truth. . . . (W)henever we feel
there is something odd in Christian theology, we shall generally find that there is something odd in the

Page 75: But, oddly enough, there really is a sense in which a creed, if it is believed at all, can be believed more
fixedly in a complex society than in a simple one. . . . For the more complicated seems the coincidence, the
less it can be a coincidence.

Pages 75-76: It is exactly as of such a miracle that I have since come to feel of the philosophy of Christianity. The
complication of our modern world proves the truth of the creed more perfectly than any of the plain
problems of the ages of faith. It was in Notting Hill and Battersea that I began to see that Christianity
was true. This is why the faith has that elaboration of doctrines and details which so much distresses
those who admire Christianity without believing in it. When once one believes in a creed, one is proud
of its complexity, as scientists are proud of the complexity of science. It shows how rich it is in
discoveries. If it is right at all, it is a compliment to say that it’s elaborately right. A stick might fit a
hole or a stone a hollow by accident. But a key and a lock are both complex. And if a key fits a lock,
you know it is the right key.

Page 76: (A) man is not really convinced of a philosophic theory when he finds that something proves it. He is
only really convinced when he finds that everything proves it.

Page 76: The whole case for civilization is that the case for it is complex. It has done so many things. But that
very multiplicity of proof which ought to make reply overwhelming makes reply impossible. There is,
therefore, about all complete conviction a kind of huge helplessness. The belief is so big that it
takes a long time to get it into action. And this hesitation chiefly arises, oddly enough, from an
indifference about where one should begin. All roads lead to Rome; which is one reason why many
people never get there.

Page 77: All I had hitherto heard of Christian theology had alienated me from it. I was a pagan at the age of
twelve, and a complete agnostic by the age of sixteen; and I cannot understand any one passing the
age of seventeen without having asked himself so simple a question.

Page 77: Our grandmothers were quite right when they said that Tom Paine and the free-thinkers unsettled the
mind. They do. They unsettled mine horribly. The rationalist made me question whether reason was of
any use whatever; and when I had finished Herbert Spencer I had got as far as doubting (for the first
time) whether evolution had occurred at all. As I laid down the last of Colonel Ingersoll’s atheistic
lectures the dreadful thought broke across my mind, "Almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian." I
was in a desperate way.

Pages 77-78: As I read and re-read all the non-Christian or anti-Christian accounts of the faith, from Huxley to
Bradlaugh, a slow and awful impression grew gradually but graphically upon my mind—the impression
that Christianity must be a most extraordinary thing. For not only (as I understood) had Christianity the
most flaming vices, but it had apparently a mystical talent for combining vices which seemed inconsistent
with each other. It was attacked on all sides and for all contradictory reasons.

Page 78: I was much moved by the eloquent attack on Christianity as a thing of inhuman gloom; for I thought (and
still think) sincere pessimism the unpardonable sin.

Page 78: They did prove to me in Chapter I. (to my complete satisfaction) that Christianity was too pessimistic; and
then, in Chapter II., they began to prove to me that it was a great deal too optimistic. One accusation
against Christianity was that it prevented men, by morbid tears and terrors, from seeking joy and liberty
in the bosom of Nature. But another accusation was that it comforted men with a fictitious providence,
and put them in a pink-and-white nursery. . . . This puzzled me; the charges seemed inconsistent.
Christianity could not at once be the black mask on a white world, and also the white mask on a black
world.

Page 79: And it did for one wild moment cross my mind that, perhaps, those might not be the very best judges
of the relation of religion to happiness who, by their own account, had neither one nor the other.

Page 79: It must be understood that I did not conclude hastily that the accusations were false or the accusers
fools. I simply deduced that Christianity must be something even weirder and wickeder than they
made out. A thing might have these two opposite vices; but it must be a rather queer thing if it did.

Pages 79-80: Here is another case of the same kind. I felt that a strong case against Christianity lay in the charge
that there is something timid, monkish, and unmanly about all that is called "Christian," especially in
its attitude towards resistance and fighting. . . . I turned the next page in my agnostic manual, and my brain turned up-side down. Now I found that I was to hate Christianity not for fighting too little, but for fighting too much. Christianity, it seemed, was the mother of wars. Christianity had deluged the world with blood. . . . The very people who reproached Christianity with the meekness and non-resistance of the monasteries were the very people who reproached it also with the violence and valour of the Crusades. It was the fault of poor old Christianity (somehow or other) both that Edward the Confessor did not fight and that Richard Coeur de Leon did. The Quakers (we were told) were the only characteristic Christians; and yet the massacres of Cromwell and Alva were characteristc Christian crimes. . . . In what world of riddles was born this monstrous murder and this monstrous meekness? The shape of Christianity grew a queerer shape every instant.

Pages 80-81: I take a third case; the strangest of all, because it involves the one real objection to the faith. The one real objection to the Christian religion is simply that it is one religion. . . . (I)n my youth, . . . I was much drawn towards the doctrine often preached in Ethical Societies—(I) mean the doctrine that there is one great unconscious church of all humanity rounded on the omnipresence of the human conscience. Creeds, it was said, divided men; but at least morals united them. . . . I believed this doctrine of the brotherhood of all men in the possession of a moral sense, and I believe it still—with other things. And I was thoroughly annoyed with Christianity for suggesting (as I supposed) that whole ages and empires of men had utterly escaped this light of justice and reason. But then I found an astonishing thing. I found that the very people who said that mankind was one church from Plato to Emerson were the very people who said that morality had changed altogether, and that what was right in one age was wrong in another. If I asked, say, for an altar, I was told that we needed none, for men our brothers gave us clear oracles and one creed in their universal customs and ideals. But if I mildly pointed out that one of men's universal customs was to have an altar, then my agnostic teachers turned clean round and told me that men had always been in darkness and the superstitions of savages. I found it was their daily taunt against Christianity that it was the light of one people and had left all others to die in the dark. But I also found that it was their special boast for themselves that science and progress were the discovery of one people, and that all other peoples had died in the dark. Their chief insult to Christianity was actually their chief compliment to themselves, and there seemed to be a strange unfairness about all their relative insistence on the two things.

Pages 81-82: This began to be alarming. It looked not so much as if Christianity was bad enough to include any vices, but rather as if any stick was good enough to beat Christianity with. What again could this astonishing thing be like which people were so anxious to contradict, that in doing so they did not mind contradicting themselves?

Page 82: Thus, certain sceptics wrote that the great crime of Christianity had been its attack on the family; it had dragged women to the loneliness and contemplation of the cloister, away from their homes and their children. But, then, other sceptics (slightly more advanced) said that the great crime of Christianity was forcing the family and marriage upon us; that it doomed women to the drudgery of their homes and children, and forbade them loneliness and contemplation.

Page 82: Christianity was reproached with its naked and hungry habits; with its sackcloth and dried peas. But the next minute Christianity was being reproached with its pomp and its ritualism; its shrines of porphry [crystalized, highly polished stone] and its robes of gold. It was abused for being too plain and for being too coloured.

Page 82: Again Christianity had always been accused of restraining sexuality too much, when Bradlaugh the Malthusian discovered that it restrained it too little.

Page 82: It is often accused in the same breath of prim respectability and of religious extravagance. Between the covers of the same atheistic pamphlet I have found the faith rebuked for its disunion, "One thinks one thing, and one another," and rebuked also for its union, "It is difference of opinion that prevents the world from going to the dogs." In the same conversation a free-thinker, a friend of mine, blamed Christianity for despising Jews, and then despised it himself for being Jewish.

Pages 82-83: I only concluded that if Christianity was wrong, it was very wrong indeed. Such hostile horrors might be combined in one thing, but that thing must be very strange and solitary. . . . But if this mass of mad contradictions really existed, quakerish and bloodthirsty, too gorgeous and too thread-bare, austere, yet pandering preposterously to the lust of the eye, the enemy of women and their foolish refuge, a solemn pessimist and a silly optimist, if this evil existed, then there was in this evil something quite supreme and unique. . . . Such a paradox of evil rose to the stature of the supernatural. It was, indeed, almost as
supernatural as the infallibility of the Pope. An historic institution, which never went right, is really quite as much of a miracle as an institution that cannot go wrong. The only explanation which immediately occurred to my mind was that Christianity did not come from heaven, but from hell. Really, if Jesus of Nazareth was not Christ, He must have been Antichrist.

Pages 83-84: Perhaps, after all, it is Christianity that is sane and all its critics that are mad—in various ways. I tested this idea by asking myself whether there was about any of the accusers anything morbid that might explain the accusation. I was startled to find that this key fitted a lock. For instance, it was certainly odd that the modern world charged Christianity at once with bodily austerity and with artistic pomp. But then it was also odd, very odd, that the modern world itself combined extreme bodily luxury with an extreme absence of artistic pomp. The modern man thought Becket’s robes too rich and his meals too poor. But then the modern man was really exceptional in history; no man before ever ate such elaborate dinners in such ugly clothes. The modern man found the church too simple exactly where modern life is too complex; he found the church too gorgeous exactly where modern life is too dingy. The man who disliked the plain fasts and feasts was mad on entrées. . . . If there was any insanity at all, it was in the extravagant entrées, not in the bread and wine.

Page 84: I went over all the cases, and I found the key fitted so far. The fact that Swinburne was irritated at the unhappiness of Christians and yet more irritated at their happiness was easily explained. It was no longer a complication of diseases in Christianity, but a complication of diseases in Swinburne. The restraints of Christians saddened him simply because he was more hedonist than a healthy man should be. The faith of Christians angered him because he was more pessimist than a healthy man should be. In the same way the Malthusians by instinct attacked Christianity; not because there is anything especially anti-Malthusian about Christianity, but because there is something a little anti-human about Malthusianism.

Page 84: Nevertheless it could not, I felt, be quite true that Christianity was merely sensible and stood in the middle. There was really an element in it of emphasis and even frenzy which had justified the secularists in their superficial criticism. . . . Its fierce crusaders and meek saints might balance each other; still, the crusaders were very fierce and the saints were very meek, meek beyond all decency.

Page 85: I remembered my thoughts about the martyr and the suicide. In that matter there had been this combination between two almost insane positions which yet somehow amounted to sanity.

Page 85: Then the most difficult and interesting part of the mental process opened, and I began to trace this idea darkly through all the enormous thoughts of our theology. The idea was that which I had outlined touching the optimist and the pessimist; that we want not an amalgam or compromise, but both things at the top of their energy; love and wrath both burning.

Page 85: (T)he idea of this combination is indeed central in orthodox theology. For orthodox theology has specially insisted that Christ was not a being apart from God and man, like an elf, nor yet a being half human and half not, like a centaur, but both things at once and both things thoroughly, very man and very God.

Page 85: But granted that we have all to keep a balance, the real interest comes in with the question of how that balance can be kept. That was the problem which Paganism tried to solve: that was the problem which I think Christianity solved and solved in a very strange way.

Pages 85-86: Paganism declared that virtue was in a balance; Christianity declared it was in a conflict: the collision of two passions apparently opposite. Of course they were not really inconsistent; but they were such that it was hard to hold simultaneously. Let us follow for a moment the clue of the martyr and the suicide; and take the case of courage. No quality has ever so much addled the brains and tangled the definitions of merely rational sages. Courage is almost a contradiction in terms. It means a strong desire to live taking the form of a readiness to die. "He that will lose his life, the same shall save it," is not a piece of mysticism for saints and heroes. It is a piece of everyday advice for sailors or mountaineers. . . . A soldier surrounded by enemies, . . . He must seek his life in a spirit of furious indifference to it; he must desire life like water and yet drink death like wine. No philosopher, I fancy, has ever expressed this romantic riddle with adequate lucidity, and I certainly have not done so. But Christianity has done more: it has marked the limits of it in the awful graves of the suicide and the hero, showing the distance between him who dies for the sake of living and him who dies for the sake of dying. . . . the mystery of chivalry: the Christian courage, which is a disdain of death . . .

Pages 86-87: And now I began to find that this duplex passion was the Christian key to ethics everywhere. Everywhere the creed made a moderation out of the still crash of two impetuous emotions. Take, for instance, the
Page 87: It separated the two ideas and then exaggerated them both. In one way Man was to be haughtier than he had ever been before; in another way he was to be humbler than he had ever been before. In so far as I am Man I am the chief of creatures. In so far as I am a man I am the chief of sinners. All humility that had meant pessimism, that had meant man taking a vague or mean view of his whole destiny—all that was to go. We were to hear no more the wail of Ecclesiastes that humanity had no pre-eminence over the brute, or the awful cry of Homer that man was only the saddest of all the beasts of the field. Man was a statue of God walking about the garden. Man had pre-eminence over all the brutes; man was only sad because he was not a beast, but a broken god.

Page 88: Christianity got over the difficulty of combining furious opposites, by keeping them both, and keeping them both furious. The Church was positive on both points. One can hardly think too little of one's self. One can hardly think too much of one's soul.

Page 88: Take another case: the complicated question of charity, which some highly uncharitable idealists seem to think quite easy. Charity is a paradox, like modesty and courage. Stated baldly, charity certainly means one of two things—pardoning unpardonable acts, or loving unlovable people. . . . Christianity came in here as before. It came in startlingly with a sword, and clove one thing from another. It divided the crime from the criminal. The criminal we must forgive unto seventy times seven. The crime we must not forgive at all. . . . We must be much more angry with theft than before, and yet much kinder to thieves than before.

Page 88: And the more I considered Christianity, the more I found that while it had established a rule and order, the chief aim of that order was to give room for good things to run wild.

Page 89: How can man be approximately free of fine emotions, able to swing them in a clear space without breakage or wrong? This was the achievement of this Christian paradox of the parallel passions.

Pages 89-90: So it was with all the other moral problems, with pride, with protest, and with compassion. By defining its main doctrine, the Church not only kept seemingly inconsistent things side by side, but, what was more, allowed them to break out in a sort of artistic violence otherwise possible only to anarchists. Meekness grew more dramatic than madness. Historic Christianity rose into a high and strange coup de théâtre of morality—things that are to virtue what the crimes of Nero are to vice. . . . Poetry could be acted as well as composed. This heroic and monumental manner in ethics has entirely vanished with supernatural religion.

Page 90: Thus, the double charges of the secularists, though throwing nothing but darkness and confusion on themselves, throw a real light on the faith. It is true that the historic Church has at once emphasised celibacy and emphasised the family; has at once (if one may put it so) been fiercely for having children and fiercely for not having children. It has kept them side by side like two strong colours, red and white, like the red and white upon the shield of St. George. It has always had a healthy hatred of pink. It hates that combination of two colours which is the feeble expedient of the philosophers. It hates that evolution of black into white which is tantamount to a dirty gray. In fact, the whole theory of the Church on virginity might be symbolized in the statement that white is a colour: not merely the absence of a colour.

Page 91: It is true that the Church told some men to fight and others not to fight; and it is true that those who fought were like thunderbolts and those who did not fight were like statues. All this simply means that the Church preferred to use its Supermen and to use its Tolstoyans. There must be some good in the life of battle, for so many good men have enjoyed being soldiers. There must be some good in the idea of non-resistance, for so many good men seem to enjoy being Quakers. All that the Church did (so far as that goes) was to prevent either of these good things from ousting the other. They existed side by side.

Pages 91-92: The real problem is —Can the lion lie down with the lamb and still retain his royal ferocity? That is the problem the Church attempted; that is the miracle she achieved. This is what I have called guessing the hidden eccentricities of life. This is knowing that a man's heart is to the left and not in the middle. This is knowing not only that the earth is round, but knowing exactly where it is flat. Christian doctrine detected the
oddities of life. It not only discovered the law, but it foresaw the exceptions. Those underrate Christianity who say that it discovered mercy; any one might discover mercy. In fact every one did. But to discover a plan for being merciful and also severe—that was to anticipate a strange need of human nature. For no one wants to be forgiven for a big sin as if it were a little one. Any one might say that we should be neither quite miserable nor quite happy. But to find out how far one may be quite miserable without making it impossible to be quite happy—that was a discovery in psychology. Any one might say, "Neither swagger nor grovel"; and it would have been a limit. But to say, "Here you can swagger and there you can grovel"—that was an emancipation.

Page 92: This was the big fact about Christian ethics; the discovery of the new balance. Paganism had been like a pillar of marble, upright because proportioned with symmetry. Christianity was like a huge and ragged and romantic rock, which, though it sways on its pedestal at a touch, yet, because its exaggerated excrescences exactly balance each other, is enthroned there for a thousand years. . . . So in Christendom apparent accidents balanced.

Page 93: Last and most important, it is exactly this which explains what is so inexplicable to all the modern critics of the history of Christianity. I mean the monstrous wars about small points of theology, the earthquakes of emotion about a gesture or a word. It was only a matter of an inch; but an inch is everything when you are balancing. The Church could not afford to swerve a hair's breadth on some things if she was to continue her great and daring experiment of the irregular equilibrium. Once let one idea become less powerful and some other idea would become too powerful. . . . Remember that the Church went in specifically for dangerous ideas; she was a lion tamer. The idea of birth through a Holy Spirit, of the death of a divine being, of the forgiveness of sins, or the fulfilment of prophecies, are ideas which, any one can see, need but a touch to turn them into something blasphemous or ferocious. . . . A sentence phrased wrong about the nature of symbolism would have broken all the best statues in Europe. A slip in the definitions might stop all the dances; might wither all the Christmas trees or break all the Easter eggs. Doctrines had to be defined within strict limits, even in order that man might enjoy general human liberties. The Church had to be careful, if only that the world might be careless.

Page 94: This is the thrilling romance of Orthodoxy. People have fallen into a foolish habit of speaking of orthodoxy as something heavy, humdrum, and safe. There never was anything so perilous or so exciting as orthodoxy. It was sanity: and to be sane is more dramatic than to be mad. It was the equilibrium of a man behind madly rushing horses, seeming to stoop this way and to sway that, yet in every attitude having the grace of statuary and the accuracy of arithmetic.

Page 94: It is always simple to fall; there are an infinity of angles at which one falls, only one at which one stands. To have fallen into any one of the fads from Gnosticism to Christian Science would indeed have been obvious and tame. But to have avoided them all has been one whirling adventure; and in my vision the heavenly chariot flies thundering through the ages, the dull heresies sprawling and prostrate, the wild truth reeling but erect.

Wit for our amusement:

Page 76: In the case of this defence of the Christian conviction I confess that I would as soon begin the argument with one thing as another; I would begin it with a turnip or a taximeter cab.

Page 77: I never read a line of Christian apologetics. I read as little as I can of them now.

Page 78: Insincere pessimism is a social accomplishment, rather agreeable than otherwise; and fortunately nearly all pessimism is insincere.

Page 94: It is always easy to let the age have its head; the difficult thing is to keep one's own. It is always easy to be a modernist; as it is easy to be a snob.